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The "Malmanagement" Problem: Finding the Roots
of Government Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
William V Roth, Jr. *
"[Great nations] may at last fail from not comprehending the great
institutions which they have created."
-Walter Bagehot'
One of the most disturbing developments in the evolution of
American democracy since World War II has been the growing dis-
trust with which citizens hold the institutions of government. Each
new public opinion poll and each new election bring fresh evidence
of public dissatisfaction and disillusionment with government and
with government officials. The polls detect a growing sense of public
alienation from government-a feeling that government at all levels
is neither responsive nor accountable to a public which, in theory
and by constitutional principle, is its master.2
One explanation for the apparently deep-seated public distrust
of government is found in the widespread impression that govern-
ment is, by and large, ineffective in solving the nation's problems,
inefficient in carrying out its assigned functions, wasteful of the tax-
payers' dollars, and highly subject to fraudulent practices by those
who work for the government and those who benefit from its pro-
grams. This impression is becoming so pervasive that the terms "bu-
reaucrat" and "politician" have taken on a distinctly pejorative
tinge, connoting to many citizens a degree of incompetence, if not
outright venality, among those who in less cynical days were appreci-
ated and respected as "public servants."
This public image of the slothful, incompetent and corrupt poli-
tician or bureaucrat is neither accurate nor fair with respect to the
majority of public officials. However, waste, inefficiency, and cor-
* Senior United States Senator from Delaware; Chairman, Senate Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs and Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
1 R. SILK & M. SILK, THE AMERICAN ESTABLISHMENT 6 (1980).
2 The schism between citizen and government can be seen in the so-called "tax revolt,"
which began with Proposition 13 in California in the late 1970's and reached its pinnacle with
the election of Ronald Reagan as President in 1980. While many factors contributed to Mr.
Reagan's election, no single element was more important than the electorate's conviction that
Mr. Reagan, if elected, would carry out his campaign promise to reduce the size and cost of
government--and with it, the financial burden of government on the citizen-taxpayer.
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ruption do exist in our institutions of government-just as they exist
in all organizations, be they small or large; public or private. These
shortcomings can never fully be eliminated from any organization,
because they stem from the basic nature of organizations themselves.
The problem is especially difficult when government agencies are in-
volved, however, because most such agencies, unlike businesses or
even non-profit private institutions, have no objectively identifiable
"bottom line" against which to measure their performance. Thus,
despite a constant drumroll of congressional statements, news media
criticism, and public outrage, waste, fraud, and abuse continue to
occur throughout the government. The best-intentioned efforts to
solve these problems continue to run aground on the harsh shoals of
reality.
If we do not begin to find better ways to deal with the problems
of waste, fraud, and abuse, the deeply-felt hostility to our nation's
institutions and representatives eventually could sap the strength and
vitality of our republic. An intensive and far-reaching effort must be
made to find and control the root causes of government waste, ineffi-
ciency, fraud, and mismanagement.
The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs is an ideal
place to begin such an effort. The Committee traditionally has
placed much of its emphasis on developing programs to mitigate gov-
ernment waste and mismanagement, as well as investigating and
calling attention to abuses. Because its jurisdiction cuts across issue
and agency boundaries and encompasses many government-wide
programs and concerns, the Committee is uniquely positioned to
probe for the institutional roots of waste, fraud, and abuse to find
ways of minimizing their damage to our system of government. For
lack of a better term, this article refers to the underlying causes of
government waste, fraud, and abuse as "malmanagement." This
term suggests a much more fundamental and pervasive problem than
"waste, fraud, and abuse," "mismanagement," or other terms which
tend to focus attention on individual offenders and specific programs,
which are only symptoms of the underlying disease.
I. What is Malmanagement?
The search for the root causes of government waste, fraud, and
abuse cannot begin without a clearer understanding of what those
terms mean and how they affect the government's ability to carry out
its functions effectively and efficiently. Lack of agreement on the
definition of the symptoms-let alone on the nature and causes of the
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underlying "disease"-has been largely responsible for the fragmen-
tation and ineffectiveness of most efforts to solve these problems.
Unfortunately, waste, fraud, and abuse are often regarded as
different words for the same concept-a kind of "triumvirate of cor-
ruption. ' 3 The terms are used so often, and so interchangeably, that
they evoke a stereotype that is almost exclusively associated with
large government programs, especially those run by federal agencies.
The words have become so common and devoid of real meaning that
one former Cabinet secretary tried to define them out of existence by
circulating a memorandum requiring the phrase "program misuse
and management inefficiency" to be substituted any time the words
waste, fraud, or abuse appeared in departmental correspondence. 4
Despite the common perception of interchangeability, impor-
tant distinctions should be made among these terms. A more precise
understanding of the terms is necessary to identify the different ef-
fects each activity has on government services and programs and to
find effective remedies for these problems.
A. Fraud
"Fraud" is perhaps the most sinister-sounding of the triumvi-
rate. Although fraud connotes an illegal act of some kind which de-
prives the government of its property or resources, no standard
definition of the term exists in government today. One recent study
found that the Department of Justice and each of the other federal
agencies had its own list of activities which it considered to be fraud,
many of which were quite different. 5 This lack of a precise and uni-
form definition of fraud reflects both the large number of agencies
trying to address the problem and the difficulty in establishing a defi-
nition that encompasses all potential types of fraud.
Despite wide variations in usage and meaning, fraud is more
fully defined than either of its two notorious companions. A defini-
tion developed by the Department of Defense typifies those now in
use:
[Fraud is] any willful act of conscious wrongdoing that adversely
affects the Government's interests. It includes, but is not limited to,
3 Address by former Comptroller General of the United States Elmer Staats before the
Town Hall of California (Jan. 13, 1981).
4 Intradepartment order by Patricia Harris, reported by Charles Osgood, CBS Radio
Network broadcast (March 11, 1980).
5 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS: How
EXTENSIVE Is IT? How CAN IT BE CONTROLLED?, Comptroller General's Report to Con-
gress (May 7, 1981).
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acts of dishonesty which contribute to a loss or injury to the
Government.6
While the popular view of fraud is often limited to such crimes
as using false identification to obtain government benefits or stealing
government property, defrauding the government can take many
other forms. Other examples of fraud include charging personal ex-
penses to a government contract, submitting false claims to an
agency for reimbursement, intentionally misallocating project costs,
suppressing the truth, and a variety of regulatory and statutory viola-
tions, including bribery, graft, and conflict of interest. Although
such wide variations complicate the problem of formulating a stan-
dard definition, the kinds of illegal actions that constitute fraud are
generally understood.
B. Waste
"Waste" is a much more difficult term to define, for no defini-
tion of waste fits everyone's notion of what constitutes wasteful activ-
ity. One person may find waste in an unnecessary or low-priority
program; another may see it in the duplication of effort between two
or more agencies; still another may consider poor management the
best example of waste. The definition of waste depends largely on
the individual's opinion as to what is, and is not, a proper govern-
ment activity, as well as the standard of efficiency to which an
agency is held. Defense expert Edward Luttwak points out that in
contrast to fraud, waste is "a question of opinion rather than law."'7
The identification of waste is often highly subjective, making the
problem much more difficult to combat.
Despite the inherent difficulties in establishing a standard defi-
nition of waste, some generally understood aspects of the problem
can form a basic and useful formulation. Waste is usually thought to
occur in the administration of programs in executive agencies. The
term is seldom used in connection with a legislative decision to ap-
prove or disapprove a particular program, although specific legisla-
tive decisions obviously can be considered wasteful. Waste usually
occurs when funds are not used efficiently to fulfill the stated goals of
a particular program. In sum, waste can be equated with the limited
concept of "mismanagement," primarily denoting inefficiency in an
6 Id. at 2.
7 Luttwak, Why We Need More Waste, Fraud and Mismanagement in the Pentagon, 73 CoM-
MENTARY 17, 18 (Feb. 1982).
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agency's use of the taxpayer's dollars to fulfill the functions or to
reach the objectives assigned to it.
C. Abuse
The third symptom of government malmanagement is perhaps
the most difficult to understand. The American Dictionary of the English
Language defines abuse as a "wrong or improper use" of a person or
object. Often abuse in government does not involve an illegal act,
but rather results from an attempt to "stretch" or broadly interpret
the meaning or intent of a law or regulation. As one expert noted in
recent testimony before a congressional committee, "abuse in govern-
mental programs involves taking advantage of loosely written stat-
utes, poorly written regulations, failure to check out eligibilities to
receive governmental assistance, and so on."8
As this description reveals, abuse can take many different forms
and usually occurs where the rules used to guide a program are
poorly drawn or difficult to understand. In most such cases, funds
are unnecessarily spent on activities which, while legal, add nothing
to the effectiveness or credibility of a program while diverting scarce
resources from assigned objectives.
D. Cost of Malmanagement
All three elements of the "triumvirate of corruption" contribute
substantially to the financial burden, both actual and perceived, that
government places on the individual citizen. Given the definitional
problems outlined above, however, it is extremely difficult to estab-
lish the actual severity or cost of these symptoms of government
malmanagement, other than in very general terms.
In the late 1970's, for example, Attorney General Benjamin
Civiletti estimated that the government lost between $2.5 billion and
$25 billion each _year through careless (wasteful) or fraudulent ac-
tions.9 A recent report by the General Accounting Office found that
the loss to the Government fromfraud alone amounted to some $220
million in a two and one-half year period. 10 Ariother GAO review
estimated that a ha/fbillion dollars is wasted every year due to poor
8 Ways To Redue Government Spending: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (statement of Elmer Staats, Comptroller General of the United
States).
9 THE ISSUE OF 1982: A BRIEFING BOOK (D. Jones & L. Webb eds. 1982) (derived from
the Conference on Alternative State and Local Policies).
10 See FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 5, at i.
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management in just one federal program.II Just servicing the out-
standing debts owed the federal government by delinquent debtors
costs the American taxpayers $14 million per day. 12
As these rather startling numbers reveal, the financial burden
imposed on taxpayers by waste, fraud, and abuse is substantial, and
the need to address the problem in a systematic and effective way is
urgent. Given the large number of government programs (estimates
range from 2,000 to 10,000), the inadequacy of management controls
in many of those programs, and the continuing growth of the federal
budget, the opportunities for waste, fraud, and abuse are numerous
and growing. The agencies and departments of the Executive
Branch are doing far too little to curb fraud and abuse and improve
internal management systems.
E. Causes of Malmanagement
There are probably as many factors contributing to government
waste, fraud, and abuse as there are definitions for the terms. One of
the most easily identified factors, and the one that may be most diffi-
cult to control, is the sheer size of the institution of government. A
recent article pointed out how rapidly the federal government has
grown since colonial times:
When George Washington's first Administration was inaugurated
in 1790, it functioned with nine single executive units and approxi-
mately 1,000 employees. A century later, the 1891 census recorded
that over 150,000 civilians were working in the Harrison Adminis-
tration. During its first 100 years, the American government had
grown nearly 10 times as fast as the population. By 1979, the exec-
utive branch employed over 2,800,000 civil servants. The assistant
administrator for Water and Hazardous Materials (a division of
EPA) presided over a staff larger than Washington's first adminis-
tration. When Jimmy Carter entered office, one in every 75 Ameri-
cans was employed by the executive branch (compared with one
per 463 in 1891 and one per 4,000 in 1790). 13
The scope and depth of the nation's budgetary problems, and
the recent proliferation of federal bureaus and agencies, are all too
familiar to any citizen with even a passing interest in news of the
federal government. A recent report by the Advisory Commission on
11 See note 8 supra.
12 Harper, Keynote Address to Symposium sponsored by the American Society of Public
Administration, 11 BUREAUCRAT 13 (1982).
13 Porter, Parkinson's Law Revisited" War and the Growth of American Government, 60 PUB.
INTEREST, Summer 1980, at 50.
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Intergovernmental Relations notes, "During 1961-1973 a total of 141
new agencies were created (nearly 36% of the 394 existing in 1973),
and none disappeared during that time. . . through this cumulative
process, the federal government has become much more complex. '14
The Advisory Commission also pointed out that the growth in fed-
eral programs and agencies has created situations in which federal
responsibilities overlap and sometimes conflict with each other. In
the area of foreign trade policy, for example, twenty-five agencies
have been given responsibility for some aspect of international com-
merce, causing confusion and inefficiency. 15 Unlike competition in
the private sector, which generally promotes efficiencies, competition
among government agencies promotes deficiencies in policy and
waste in management.
Even those measures of the size of government cited above do
not truly reflect the pervasive influence of the federal enterprise on
American society. Increasingly, the federal government has enlisted
the efforts of other levels of government, as well as the private sector,
in attaining national objectives. As Lester M. Salamon pointed out:
[A] significant transformation has taken place in the way the fed-
eral government goes about its business--a shift from direct to indi-
rect or "third party" government, from a situation in which the
federal government ran its own programs to one in which it increas-
ingly relies on a wide variety of "third parties"--states, cities, spe-
cial districts, banks, hospitals, manufacturers, and others-to carry
out its purposes instead.' 6
In 1981, the federal government spent more than $220 billion on
payments to federal contractors and state and local governments. 17
At the same time, the number of people indirecty employed by the
federal government through federally sponsored programs has grown
to eight million.' 8
These two factors-size and the expenditure of vast sums of
money through third parties--make the federal government highly
14 ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, The FederalRole in the Fed-
eral System: The Dynamics of Growth, No. A-77, at 44 (July 1980).
15 R. Ahearn & D. Driscoll, Executive Branch Organization to Formulate and Implement US
Foreign Trade and Investment Poliy (Congressional Research Service Aug. 25, 1981).
16 L. Salamon, Rethinking Public Management, working paper prepared for the 1980 Ameri-
can Political Science Association annual meeting, at 2, published in URBAN INSTITUTE.
17 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BuDGET, Proposal for a Uniform Federal Procurement Sys-
tem, at v (Feb. 26, 1982); FederalAid to State and Local Governments, Special Analysis H at 3 (Feb.
1982).
18 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, A Presidencyfor the 1980"s, Panel
Report on Presidential Management (Nov. 1980).
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susceptible to waste, fraud, and abuse. The attorney in Kurt Von-
negut's God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater, understood full well the fees to
be derived from seizing the "magic moment" when large sums of
money are about to change hands. In the same way, every time fed-
eral funds are spent for such activities as grant and procurement pro-
grams, the likelihood increases that some of those funds will be
wasted or stolen. The growth of the federal work force has magnified
the difficulties of establishing effective management controls and pro-
cedures to minimize misspending and illegal activities.
II. Is Anybody Accountable Anymore?
The ultimate effect of increasing government size and reliance
on third parties is to diffuse responsibility and accountability for the
operation of federal programs. This loss of accountability makes it
nearly impossible to assign either credit or blame for the administra-
tion or maladministration of government programs to any person or,
in some cases, to any single agency.
As used here, accountability refers to mechanisms designed to
encourage or force federal agencies to carry out given policies or pro-
grams in the ways intended by Congress, with a minimum of waste
or unnecessary expenditures. The textbooks tell us that good man-
agement requires the effective delegation of authority among well-
trained agency employees who are accountable to their supervisors.
Ideally, these employees report to top-level managers who must in
turn appear before Congress and be held responsible for the proper
operation of programs under their control. The ultimate accounta-
bility, in theory at least, is the election process, through which Con-
gress is held to account for its actions by the American public.
This idealized accountability scheme, however, is greatly com-
plicated by several factors besides the size of government and its in-
creasing reliance on third parties. One such factor is the lack of any
strong incentives for the bureaucracy to operate programs efficiently
or sanctions with which to punish poor management. As one recent
study noted:
Economists long ago pointed out the differences between the incen-
tive structure faced by private sector providers of private goods and
public sector providers of public goods. Bureaus and agencies are
not profit-making entities. Thus, their performance is not judged
by the usual private sector standards. Indeed, for many agencies it
is difficult to make even the roughest estimate of the overall benefits
and costs of their activities. How are public goods like defense and
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education to be valued? 19
The author goes on to say that the lack of incentives for improv-
ing program management and the unwillingness of managers to take
responsibility for program results is not just an insidious conspiracy
among bureaucrats hell-bent on spending federal funds as they
please. Rather it results, in part at least, from the inherent difficul-
ties involved in attempting to measure the effectiveness of federal
programs--difficulties often compounded by unclear or conflicting
objectives contained in much legislation. It is extremely difficult to
hold someone accountable for reaching an objective which has never
been clearly defined and which has no quantifiable measure of
achievement.
Unfortunately, as the foregoing discussion suggests, good man-
agement may not always--or ever-hold as high a place on an
agency's list of priorities as, for example, the annual rite of insuring
that all appropriated funds are spent before the end of the fiscal year.
With few if any well-defined standards by which to judge program
effectiveness, many managers seem to resist saving money out of con-
cern that cost reductions will result in smaller appropriations for the
following year. Managing dollars thus takes a back seat to pushing
the money out the door and planning a still-bigger agency budget in
the next fiscal year.
Even top political appointees, armed with strong mandates from
the President to eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse, have run aground
while attempting to institute changes and establish incentives to
strengthen the management of their agencies. One reason for this is
turnover; many of these officials serve for only brief periods of time
before moving to other positions or returning to the private sector,
making it nearly impossible for them to gain effective control of their
agencies. A recent study on U.S. defense planning explains:
Education and experience prepared few top officials to participate
effectively in the defense strategy formulation process over the past
36 years. Fast turnovers allowed little time for the brainiest incum-
bents to become proficient. Average tenures are so short that even
fully qualified civilians and military men customarily found it al-
most impossible to promulgate cohesive policies and programs,
much less pursue them to successful conclusions. Those who fa-
thered failures rarely remained in place long enough to take
responsibility.20
19 M. Fiorina, Bureaucratic Failures: Causes and Cures, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF AMERI-
CAN BUSINESs no. 43, at 13-14 (Oct. 1981).
20 J. Collins, US Defense Planning: A Critique (Congressional Research Service July 1982).
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Strong, sustained leadership is needed from the top levels of any
agency to insure that programs to minimize waste, fraud, and abuse
are strictly enforced.2 1 Rapid and continuous changes in top leader-
ship can impossibly complicate such efforts.
To confuse the issue still further, a substantial majority of fed-
eral employees believe little will be accomplished even if they do par-
ticipate in efforts to reduce waste, fraud, and abuse. A recent survey
by the Merit Systems Protection Board found that 53 percent of fed-
eral employees surveyed believed that "nothing would be done" if
they were to report incidents of mismanagement or fraudulent activ-
ity to their supervisors.2 2 Agency employees are the most likely
group among all those involved in federal programs to encounter in-
stances of waste, fraud, and abuse. If they have little faith that top
management will act to correct specific incidents of mismanagement,
it is that much less likely that employees will work enthusiastically to
implement management initiatives against fraud and waste, even
when such programs are espoused by the President.
Many of the factors contributing to the high incidence of waste,
fraud, and abuse in federal programs stem directly from the relation-
ship between the agencies of the Executive Branch and Congress.
Because of the inherent problems of short tenure, lack of objectively
identifiable performance measures, and others noted above, the Ex-
ecutive Branch is presently unable to eliminate, or even substantially
reduce, the amount of waste, fraud, and abuse afflicting government
programs. Ideally, where internal reforms are insufficient, Congress
should be able to step in and finish the job. Aside from policy direc-
tives and changes in funding levels, both of which affect agency oper-
ations, Congress can also attempt to hold agencies accountable for
their actions through the use of oversight hearings and investigations.
Well-planned oversight hearings can prod agencies to improve their
performance and can spotlight the need for management reforms
and continued emphasis on anti-fraud efforts.
Unfortunately, the oversight mechanism is not working nearly
as well as it should. The structural reasons for the breakdown in
congressional oversight will be discussed later in this paper. For now,
suffice it to point out that the number of hearings held by commit-
tees of the House of Representatives, many of which are oversight
21 See FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, .ufpra note 5, at 16-17.
22 OFFICE OF MERIT SYSTEMS REVIEW AND STUDIES, Do Federal Employees Face Reprisal
for Reporting Fraud, Waste, or Mismanagement?, Preliminary'Report by the U.S. Merit Systems
Protection Board, at 3 (Apr. 1981).
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hearings, has declined dramatically over the past few years-from
more than 7,000 committee meetings in the 96th Congress to roughly
5,500 meetings in the 97th.23 Activity in Senate committees, while
not dropping as precipitously as in the House, has also shown a
marked decline. Without built-in incentives to encourage manage-
ment efficiency and vigorous anti-fraud efforts in the agencies, and
without forceful congressional prodding, it is not difficult to under-
stand why recent efforts to combat the "triumvirate of corruption"
have faltered.
III. Coping in the Short Term
Despite the difficulties of mounting a comprehensive attack on
waste, fraud, and abuse-let alone finding a cure for the underlying
disease of which they are only symptoms-a number of short-term
improvements have been suggested which may reduce, if not elimi-
nate, some of the most troublesome manifestations of the
malmanagement problem. These "tactical" measures, which include
legislative remedies, stepped-up oversight of specific examples of
waste, fraud, and abuse, and more vigorous anti-fraud efforts by the
Executive Branch, are focused primarily on maintaining congres-
sional pressure on the immediate problems until a long-range, "stra-
tegic" approach to expose and control the more fundamental and
pervasive problem of malmanagement can be developed.
Most of the short-term remedies now being developed or imple-
mented are intended to enhance the accountability of federal agen-
cies and employees to top-level management and to Congress. Most
are designed to institutionalize the overall effort to minimize waste
and prevent fraud and abuse. Short-term measures seek to create
new incentives for agencies to devote more of their attention and re-
sources to dealing with the problems of waste, fraud, and abuse.
None of these tactical improvements, nor all of them together,
can eliminate the causes of waste, fraud, and abuse. These measures
may, however, improve the efficiency with which selected programs
are administered, despite the roadblocks to good management which
stand in the way. At least the improvements may make it easier for
conscientious managers to steer around the existing roadblocks to ef-
ficient administration.
A major structural impediment to effective controls on waste,
fraud, and abuse is the lack of effective mechanisms for preventing
23 N. Ornstein, T. Mann, M. Malbin & J. Bibby, Vital Staisties on Congress, AM. ENTER-
PRISE INST. 130-33 (1982).
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fraud and mismanagement in most federal agencies. Instead, the
dominant system is "management by exception," in which problems
in program operations are dealt with only after they have erupted.
Effective internal control systems would greatly assist in improv-
ing agency management and reducing fraud. Internal controls are
standard mechanisms built into agency management processes, and
operate routinely to insure efficient operations. Such mechanisms
range from sophisticated computer programs which do not allow in-
correct or incompatible entries to be made in agency accounts to sim-
ple regulations which prevent an employee who is authorized to
approve an invoice from also overseeing the actual payment of the
invoice.
Good internal controls commonly exist in most well-run busi-
nesses, but such controls are sadly lacking in the majority of federal
agencies. To correct that deficiency, the Governmental Affairs Com-
mittee recommended and Congress passed legislation in the 97th
Congress, which was subsequently signed into law, intended to pro-
vide agencies with incentives to improve their internal controls. The
legislation requires each federal agency to perform an annual assess-
ment and report to Congress on the condition of its internal con-
trols. 24 The new law, known as the Federal Managers' Financial
Integrity Act, also seeks to improve agency accountability by requir-
ing agency heads to personally cerlify that their agency's internal con-
trol systems are sound, and if they are not, to explain what will be
done to correct the shortcomings. While there has been a law on the
books since 1950 requiring agencies to maintain internal control sys-
tems, the new law marks the first effort since that date to force
agency heads, including Cabinet secretaries, to focus their attention
on management systems and to stand publicly accountable for their
adequacy or inadequacy.2 5 The first reports under the new law are
due in December of 1983.
Another law designed to enhance agency efforts to reduce waste,
fraud, and abuse is the Inspector General Act, enacted in 1978.26
This law complements the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity
Act. One of its purposes is to strengthen and consolidate agency au-
diting and investigative resources in order to identify fraud and
waste in ongoing agency programs. The Act, and similar laws, estab-
24 Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-255, 96 Stat. 814
(1982).
25 See FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 5, at 24.
26 Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101, 5 U.S.C.A. App. I
(West Supp. 1983).
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lished Inspectors General in fifteen federal departments and agencies.
These officials are responsible not only for auditing and investigating
the effectiveness of agency expenditures, but also for recommending
improvements in management and internal control systems and es-
tablishing overall audit policies. The Inspector Generals are in-
dependent from the agencies in which they work, and are required to
regularly and directly report on their activities to Congress.
Until recently, a major weakness in the Inspector General Act
was the absence of a statutorily established Office of Inspector Gen-
eral in the Department of Defense. Because the Pentagon spends
more than 24 percent of the Federal budget and about 75 percent of
all government procurement funds,2 7 the absence of such an office
left a major portion of the government without a strong, coordinated
audit and investigative arm.
This defect was remedied last year when Congress adopted my
amendment to the 1982 Defense Authorization Act creating an Of-
fice of Inspector General in the Defense Department.2 8 This new of-
fice will help coordinate the work of some 18,000 auditors and
investigators already in the Department.
The statutory provisions discussed above lay the groundwork for
improvements in the internal control and management systems of the
agencies. Both the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act and
the Inspector General Act establish accountability mechanisms, one
making agency heads directly responsible for their management sys-
tems and the other creating special offices to oversee efforts to reduce
waste, fraud, and abuse. While these laws are important steps, they
will be useless if they are not implemented effectively. Strong con-
gressional oversight of these laws is essential to insure sustained
agency interest in carrying them out.
One major factor in the recent decline of congressional oversight
has been Congress' preoccupation with budgetary issues. Over the
last few years, the budget process, as established under the Congres-
sional Budget Act of 1974, has come to dominate the congressional
policymaking process. The schedule for considering the congres-
sional budget and related funding matters has critically cut into the
time available for other important legislative activities, including
oversight.2 9 If some aspects of the budgetary and appropriations pro-
27 See Proposalfor a Uniform Federal Procurement System, supra note 17, at 1.
28 Department of Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1117, 96 Stat. 718
(1982).
29 Tate, Use of Omnibus Bills Burgeons Despite Members' Misgivings; Long- Ter Impact Is Dis-
puted, 40 CONG. Q. No. 39, at 2379-83 (Sept. 25, 1982).
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cess could be combined or eliminated, additional time would be
available for the other vital responsibilities of Congress, especially
oversight hearings and investigations.
To correct this imbalance in congressional responsibilities, I
have proposed legislation which would institute a two-year budget
cycle, thus reducing the demands of the budget process and increas-
ing the time available for oversight. 30 The bill would require, at the
beginning of each Congress, a single, binding budget resolution set-
ting revenue and spending targets for the following two years. The
start of the fiscal year would be changed from October 1 to January
1 to give Congress a full year to complete budget actions. In addi-
tion, the thirteen separate appropriations bills would be combined
into a single, two-year appropriations measure. This bill also would
be agreed to in the first year of each Congress. Concentrating budget
decisions in the first year would permit Congress to spend most of the
second year of each cycle on authorization measures and oversight.
The proposed bill would lay the groundwork for a deliberative and
stable legislative process, allowing congressional committees to more
carefully plan their oversight activities.
Stronger congressional oversight provides incentive for agencies
to step up their anti-fraud and management improvement efforts.
Waste, fraud, and abuse will never be substantially reduced, how-
ever, unless agency heads are given sufficient opportunity to press for
improvements in program management and fraud prevention. The
high turnover of political appointees noted earlier prevents accounta-
ble, high-level officials from gaining effective control over their agen-
cies during their normal tenure in office.
Little can be done to eliminate rapid changes in the political
hierarchy of the Executive Branch; change in agency leadership is
one method used by all Presidents to realign their policies and priori-
ties. A great deal can be done, however, about the paucity of effective
management information systems which greet most new political ap-
pointees when they assume office. The Senate Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs learned in recent hearings, for example, that
almost no effective system exists in any of the civilian agencies to
provide up-to-date information on the cost, schedule, and projected
completion dates of major acquisition projects.3 1 Furthermore, very
little historical data was available to show how particular agency
30 S. 2629, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S6799 (daily ed. June 15, 1982).
31 Federal Agency Acquisition Management: Hean'ngs on S 2397 Before the Senate Comm. on Cov-
ernmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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projects had progressed since their inception, despite the fact that
many of these projects cost billions of dollars.
Since most major acquisitions take years to complete, cost,
scheduling, and historical information would be highly useful-if not
essential-to political appointees assuming top-level management
positions. Effective information systems which could quickly provide
such information on major agency acquisitions would allow new
managers to gain control of these programs in a short time and to
pursue management improvement efforts. The lack of this data is
often one of the chief stumbling blocks preventing political appoin-
tees from properly managing the procurement operations for which
they are responsible.
- With this problem in mind, I introduced legislation last year
designed to improve agency acquisition management by forcing the
Executive Branch to upgrade its information systems. The bill,
known as the Cost Reduction in Major Procurements Act (S. 2397),
would require all civil agencies to develop standard reporting systems
on their major acquisition projects and to report annually to Con-
gress on the status and cost growth of these projects. The reporting
system would be similar to that now required of the Department of
Defense; several studies have found that the Pentagon's reports to
Congress on the acquisition of major weapons systems have helped to
improve the way those projects are managed. 32
Procurement is one of the fastest-growing segments of the fed-
eral budget. It is therefore important not only to keep track of the
cost growth of specific projects, but also to insure that all government
acquisitions are purchased at the lowest possible price. One of the
best ways to keep costs down is to insist on open and fair competition
on as many government contracts as possible. Some studies have
shown that competitive procurement can save as much as 30 percent
of the cost of each contract. 33
Unfortunately, Executive Branch agencies have shown little in-
terest in using effective competitive procurement techniques. The
General Accounting Office has found that only 35 percent of all De-
fense Department contracts were competed for during a one year pe-
32 For a good description of the Selected Acquisition Reporting System, see U.S. GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, "SARs"--DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORTS THAT SHOULD
PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION TO CONGRESS, Comptroller General's Report to Congress
(May 9, 1980).
33 Acquisition Process in the Department of Defense: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govern-
mental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 432-33 (1981) (The Analytic Sciences Corporation, An
Analysis of the Impact of Dual Sourcing of Defente Procurements, Aug. 7, 1981).
[Vol. 58:9611
THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
riod; the rest were granted on a "sole-source" basis to a particular
company 4
Lack of competition in agency contracting is almost always
wasteful. In some cases, it leads to abuse of the procurement laws as
agencies seek to take advantage of loopholes in order to "sole-source"
their contracts, despite congressional intent to the contrary.
Legislation designed to encourage greater levels of competition
in agency contracting was introduced in the 97th Congress. The
Competition in Contracting Act, S. 2127, continues the statutory
preference for competition but also requires agencies to justify, in
writing, any use of noncompetitive procurement. While this bill
would not stop all noncompetitive procurement, it would cause the
agencies to consider each procurement action more carefully, elimi-
nating at least some of the waste inherent in noncompetitive
procurement.
Several other legislative initiatives have resulted from hearings
conducted by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions, an arm of the Governmental Affairs Committee. The Subcom-
mittee has focused much of its attention on specific examples of fraud
in federal programs, such as the Department of Labor's $780-million-
a-year federal workers' compensation program, 35 the Medicare home
health care program administered by the Department of Health and
Human Services, 36 and the use of false identification to commit So-
cial Security fraud and other fraud in federal and state benefit pro-
grams.3 7 The Subcommittee has also looked at and recommended
improvements in the management of the Department of Energy's re-
search and development facilities,38 and has examined the problem
of widespread fraud in commodities future trading.3 9
34 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOD Loses Many Competitive Procurement Opportuni-
ties, Comptroller General's Report to Rep. Stephen Solarz (July 29, 1981).
35 Federal Workers' Compensation Fraud and Abuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations
of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Federal Workers' Compen-
sation Fraud and Abuse, Part Two: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
36 Home Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See also S. Rep. No. 210, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
37 Federal Identification Fraud- Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
38 Oversight of Department of Energy Research and Development Facilities: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
39 Commodity Investment Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). See also S. Rep. No. 495, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982).
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IV. The Search for Long-Term Solutions
All of the congressional hearings and legislative and administra-
tive initiatives previously discussed are important in holding agency
managers to stricter standards of accountability, as well as focusing
congressional and public attention on specific instances of waste,
fraud, and abuse. By themselves, however, these efforts are inade-
quate to deal with the underlying cause of the problems-the phe-
nomenon referred to earlier as "malmanagement." The short-term,
narrowly focused tactics must therefore be coupled with an overall
strategy for controlling the roots of waste, fraud, and abuse. That
strategy must recognize the complex interrelationships among these
symptoms and deal with them as a single, unified problem instead of
as discrete issues.
Malmanagement encompasses the entire spectrum of fraudu-
lent, wasteful, abusive, and poorly conceived or badly managed gov-
ernment activities. The concept provides a point of departure from
which to begin unifying what had traditionally been a badly frag-
mented and only sporadically effective congressional attack on waste,
fraud, and abuse.
Many congressional functions are currently performed by a
wide variety of highly autonomous committees and subcommittees.
Some of these committees concern themselves with the authorization
of government programs, a function which usually encompasses both
the establishment--or, much less frequently, the disestablishment-
of programs, and the "oversight" necessary to insure that the execu-
tive agencies are carrying out their assigned functions efficiently and
in the way Congress intended. Other committees are responsible for
shaping the outline of the federal budget and for appropriating funds
from that budget to the executive agencies and to the various activi-
ties administered by those agencies. Still other committees concen-
trate on the development of broad, government-wide or national
legislation. These committees frequently have no direct role in either
oversight or the apportionment of funds to agency activities.
This structure, which has gradually evolved over the years as the
functions of Congress have grown and become more specialized, is
ill-suited to deal with government "malmanagement." The fragmen-
tation of committee responsibilities makes it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for oversight committees to significantly contribute either to the
development of government-wide policies which may be directly rel-
evant to the operatibns of the overseen agency, or to the appropria-
tions process through which the agencies are funded and which
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constitutes the only continuing, direct source of rewards and sanc-
tions available to Congress in directing the work of the Executive
Branch.
Fragmentation of congressional committees effectively allows
government agencies to conduct many, if not most, of their activities
in a "business-as-usual" manner, including the elements of those ac-
tivities which constitute waste, fraud, and abuse. This fragmentation
inevitably leads to serious distortions in the congressional oversight
process. Because oversight committees have virtually exclusive juris-
diction over particular agencies and departments, and spend much of
their time conducting oversight and authorization hearings involving
those agencies, committee members and staff tend to develop close
working relationships with agency officials. This understandable and
natural tendency too often leads committees to treat agency officials
with kid gloves, thereby compromising the oversight process and ren-
dering it much less effective than it could or should be.
Attacking the roots of government waste, fraud, and abuse
under the rubric of malmanagement would provide much greater
unity and effectiveness in congressional oversight. The concept can
provide a point of reference to help all congressional committees fo-
cus their efforts and attention on those governmental structures and
activities which create additional and needless financial burdens on
an overtaxed public.
The unified perspective for attacking malmanagement contains
four major elements:
(1) Oversight. How can Congress learn whether an agency is carry-
ing out its functions efficiently and effectively?
(2) Enforcement. What can Congress do to insure that deviations
from congressional intent, poor management practices, or other un-
desirable activities are corrected?
(3) Guidance. How can Congress insure that agencies understand
the intent of Congress in the first place?
(4) Reforms. How can the underlying causes of wasteful, fraudulent,
or abusive agency activities be identified and mitigated?
The first three elements in this list are tactical, dealing mainly
with immediate responses to existing problems. Reforms, however,
are geared to the future; they constitute a kind of preventive
medicine designed to correct the underlying causes of past and pres-
ent problems. Such reforms include reorganizations, changes in
agency charters, authorization of new programs, and the creation of
new organizations.
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In order to deal with the complex malmanagement issues which
underlie the surface manifestations of waste, fraud, and abuse, these
four elements of congressional control must be coordinated to a
much greater extent than they have been in the past. The activities
of the committees involved in each function must be closely inte-
grated. For example, proper enforcement to insure agency compli-
ance with congressional guidance requires close coordination and
communication between and among the oversight and appropria-
tions committees. The oversight function, in turn, would be much
more effective if it were able to more directly influence the general
guidance which is given to the agencies. Committees dealing with
reorganizations and changes in agency charters should have continu-
ing communication with their oversight and enforcement
counterparts.
The suggested cooperation and communication will require new
attitudes and approaches on the part of virtually every congressional
committee-changes which will take place only gradually and, in
some instances, only after much initial resistance has been overcome.
There are, however, some immediate steps that can be taken to help
lay the groundwork for this new approach. For example, a substan-
tial amount of government malmanagement stems from Congress'
inability to provide proper guidance to the Executive Branch with
respect to legislative intent. This element of malmanagement is often
overlooked, and even more often misunderstood. Thorough scrutiny
of the shortcomings of congressional guidance by the Governmental
Affairs Committee would help to acquaint Congress with the need
for improving this vital aspect of congressional control.
In a very general sense, the guidance under which agencies oper-
ate takes the form of "policies." As used here, however, policies are
not just opinions. If they are to have any value, policies must obli-
gate individuals or organizations to act in a certain way, usually in a
way that they would otherwise not be inclined to act.
Policies take many forms, such as laws, regulations, executive
orders, directives, and court decisions. Whatever their form, how-
ever, policies that can effectively influence behavior must have the
following characteristics:
1) The guidance must be unambiguous and easily understood.
2) The guidance must be adequate to deal with the activity to
which it pertains.
3) The guidance must be necessary, and not be gratuitous or
done simply for political effect.
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4) The guidance must be, from the perspective of the agency
officials who are bound by it, reasonable, practical, and "do-able."
5) The guidance must be made available to the agencies that are
obligated to follow it in a way that cannot escape the notice of re-
sponsible agency officials.
6) The guidance must be issued by adequate and appropriate
authority.
7) The guidance must be supported by adequate resources to
allow for efficient and effective implementation.
Much of the misunderstanding of guidance centers on the point
dealing with authority. As noted earlier, a policy is not the same as
an opinion. When the President of the United States proposes legis-
lation to the Congress, or instructs the Solicitor General to make rep-
resentations before the Supreme Court on an important case, he is not
setting national policy. In such cases, the President is merely expres-
sing his opinion as to the way the legislation should be formulated, or
the way the judicial opinion should be rendered. National policy, by
and large, is set by the Congress, and through delegation, by the in-
dependent regulatory agencies. The Judicial Branch is charged with
applying such "national policies" to specific cases. The Executive
Branch is responsible for enforcing these policies, and, by delegation,
for implementing policy through the promulgation of detailed
regulations.
The President has not only the authority, but the clear obliga-
tion, to set federal policy. As the Chief Executive Officer of the
United States, the President is expected to manage the Executive
Branch, which constitutes the bulk of the federal government. Con-
gress may, and sometimes does, set general constraints, but the norm
calls for the President to develop guidance covering specific Execu-
tive Branch agency activities.
This understanding of the concept of "policy" is essential if gov-
ernment malmanagement is to be brought under control, because all
government activities are bounded and defined by policies. To more easily
visualize this fact, government activities can be viewed as a matrix.
The top, or horizontal, dimension consists of "structural" policies,
while the side, or vertical, dimension consists of "behavioral" policies.
Structural policies define and guide agencies' broad missions,
the functions they have been created and authorized to carry out.
Examples include defending the nation from enemy attack, enforcing
the domestic laws, creating and maintaining a healthy economy, pro-
moting the national interest abroad, providing a reasonable level of
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general social welfare, and providing an education for all Americans.
The fact that many of these missions correspond closely to the statu-
tory charters of the various Executive Branch departments and agen-
cies is no accident, since mission-oriented policies are designed to
state why an agency exists in the first place.
Behavioral policies, on the other hand, guide how an agency is to
carry out its mission. Behavioral policies are much more numerous
than structural policies, simply because they generally apply to all
government agencies. Examples of behavioral policies include plac-
ing maximum reliance on the private sector in government procure-
ments; acquiring goods and services competitively, respecting the
proper separation of federal from state and local government func-
tion (a concept now being discussed under the general topic of "fed-
eralism"), respecting the individual citizen's right to privacy, and
providing the citizen with adequate access to information about gov-
ernment activities.
Even with these structural and behavioral policies defining the
bounds of legitimate agency activities, agency managers still enjoy a
generous degree of discretion to take into account any specific factors
unique to varying situations. When an agency manager abuses this
discretion and causes the agency to operate outside of its assigned
mission (as defined by the appropriate structural policy), such an ac-
tion would, by definition, be wasteful. Similarly, when an agency
ignores the behavioral policies relating to competitive procurement
or to placing maximum reliance on the private sector, the activity in
question would, in all likelihood, cost the taxpayers more than if the
policies had been followed-again creating a form of waste or abuse.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the root causes of govern-
ment waste, fraud, and abuse cannot be dealt with through a series of
relatively narrow and specific measures, important as those measures
may be in dealing with short-term problems. Far-ranging and fun-
damental changes are needed in the structure, as well as the manage-
ment, of the federal government. One way to bring about such
changes would be to establish a blue-ribbon commission to study and
propose reforms in the basic structure of our federal system of
government.
The last comprehensive reviews of the American government
were made by the two Hoover Commissions in the late 1940's and in
the 1950's. Since these reviews were made, the organization and op-
eration of the federal government has undergone constant change.
There has yet been no effort to determine how those changes have
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improved or weakened the management of the public's business. In-
stead, efforts at government reform have moved in fits and starts to-
ward no clear conclusion. The haphazard, uncoordinated evolution
of government over the past twenty years has contributed substan-
tially to the complexity, inefficiency, and malmanagement of our
government today. 40
An independent, high-level commission, modeled after the ear-
lier Hoover Commissions, is badly needed to review the present
structure of government and to recommend comprehensive, inte-
grated proposals to improve government performance and accounta-
bility. My legislation in the 97th Congress to create such a
commission, S. 10, would have established a bi-partisan, eighteen-
member citizen's commission composed of distinguished Americans
knowledgeable about government. The Commission would not per-
form a de nouveau "study" of government as such, but instead would
use the massive body of information which now exists on government
performance and draw up a series of conclusions and recommenda-
tions. If the Commission performs as envisioned, its report would
provide the basis of a comprehensive reform in the structure and
functioning of government.41 The Commission would also serve to
establish a consensus on needed reforms, many of which are already
recognized as important but remain unimplemented because of a
lack of sustained public support.
Skeptics will ask whether another report by another government
commission can really make a difference in stimulating government
reforms. Many of the most basic reforms in our government have
resulted from commissions or study committees, including the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1950, the Federal Property and Ad-
ministrative Services Act of 1949, the Reorganization Act, and even
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
The structure of government must clearly be reformed to make
it more manageable and efficient. Current reform efforts lack a gen-
eral agreement on what those reforms should be and how they should
be implemented. A Citizen's Commission is an ideal mechanism for
determining the best approach and for building public support for a
fundamental restructuring of our government.
40 R. Moe, The Federal Executive Establishment: Evaluation and Trends (Congressional Re-
search Service Oct. 16, 1979).
41 See generally Porter, supra note 13, for one of the best of these studies.
[June 19831
THE MALMANAGEMENT PROBLEM
V. Conclusions
As Congress gradually moves to better understand the signifi-
cance and dynamics of the complex policy structure which underlies
all government activities, it will also begin to realize that "waste,
fraud, and abuse," as symptoms of the deeper problem of
malmanagement, cannot be separated from one another and dealt
with as individual problems. To help further this understanding, I
intend to focus the long-range activities of the Governmental Affairs
Committee on addressing the broader, more fundamental problem of
malmanagement. In one sense, that focus will represent no substan-
tial change; the Committee will continue to carry out its oversight
functions, and it will continue to develop legislative measures
designed to improve government accountability.
As previously discussed, these activities are essentially tactical,
dealing primarily with limited or short-term responses to relatively
narrow and immediate problems. This tactical approach, for the
most part, deals with problems only after they have become serious
enough to come to congressional attention, and only after, in many
cases, resources have been irretrievably lost.
A parallel, strategic attack on the problem of malmanagement is
needed to supplement this tactical approach. Viewing Executive
Branch activities from a broader and deeper perspective will reveal
impending problems and potential sources of waste, fraud, and abuse
at a much earlier stage than revealed by the more traditional author-
ization, appropriations, and oversight activities. This approach will
enable Congress to move from maintaining an essentially reactive
posture, responding haphazardly to the "issue of the week," toward
achieving a greater ability to anticipate and deal with potential
problems before they turn into crises. Steps toward establishing this
strategic oversight perspective have begun only recently, and the ef-
fectiveness of this approach remains to be tested. However, the po-
tential for marked improvements in congressional ability to identify,
anticipate, and eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse throughout the
government is enormous.
The strategic perspective enables planning and foresight. Iden-
tifying the fundamental structural flaws that underlie immediate
problems should enable the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
to work with other congressional committees to help insure that their
efforts are coordinated and effective. Congressional hearings will be-
come more comprehensive, mote broadly based, and more focused
on the fundamental concepts and structural anomalies underlying
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federal programs, thus improving the consistency, depth, and objec-
tive detachment of the entire congressional oversight process.
This two-pronged approach to malmanagement problems-
combining the tactical with the strategic-will enable the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee, and ultimately Congress as a
whole, to confidently anticipate the issues which will rise to highest
priority in the future, and to begin dealing with them in a way that
will minimize the adverse effects of malmanagement on the taxpay-
ers and on society as a whole. This function is one of the most impor-
tant responsibilities Congress can perform as the representative of the
American people. As John Stuart Mill has noted:
The idea of a rational democracy is, not that the people themselves
govern, but that they have security for good government. This se-
curity they cannot have by any other means than by retaining in
their own hands the ultimate control. If they renounce this, they
give themselves up to tyranny. 42
42 1 J. MILL, DISSERTATIONS AND DiscussIoNs 470-71 (London 1859).
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